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NOTE
DomEsTIc RELATIONS-DIVORCE-EX Parte DECREE, HELD, NOT TO TERMINATE OBLIGATION OF SUPPORT UNDER "DIvISIBLE DIVORCE" DocnUNE.-In a

recent decision' affirm-

ing a judgment of the New York Court of Appeals,2 the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of section 1170-b of the New York Civil Practice Act.3
The holding established that the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution 4 and its implementing statute5 do not require the state of a wife's domicile to
recognize, as determinative of her right to alimony, an otherwise valid ex parte divorce
decree rendered by another state. It now seems clear that each state is free to apply
local law in determining the support rights of its domiciliaries whether or not such
rights were reduced to judgment prior to the divorce.
Section 1170-b was enacted by chapter 663 of the laws of 1953, upon the recommendation of the New York Law Revision Commission. 6 It permits the New York
1 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U. S. 416, 77 S. Ct. 1360, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1456 (1957).

Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 1 N. Y. 2d 342, 135 N. E. 2d 553 (1956).
3 N. Y. CIv. PRAC. ACT § 1170-b:
"Maintenance of wife where divorce or annulment previously granted on non-personal
jurisdiction.
In an action for divorce, separation or annulment, or for a declaration of nullity
of a void marriage, where the court refuses to grant such relief by reason of a finding
by the court that a divorce, annulment or judgment declaring the marriage a nullity
had previously been granted to the husband in an action in which jurisdiction over the
person of the wife was not obtained, the court may, nevertheless, render in the same
action such judgment as justice may require for the maintenance of the wife. The
court, by order, at any time thereafter upon the application of either party to the
action, after due notice to the other, to be given in such manner as the court shall
direct, may annul, vary or modify such judgment. Subject to the provisions of section
eleven hundred and seventy-one-b of this act, the authority granted by this section
shall extend to unpaid sums or installments accrued prior to the application as well
as sums or installments to become due thereafter."
4 U. S. CoNsT., Art. 4, § 1:
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each state to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof."
5 Act of May 26, 1790, 1 STAT. 122, as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 1738 (1948):
"Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they have by law or usage
in- the courts of such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken."
6 REPORT OF NEW YOR LAW REVIsION COMMISSION (1953) at 463-80:
"A wife who has obtained in New York a separation order with maintenance provisions may enforce these provisions against her husband even though he may subsequently
have obtained an ex parte foreign divorce entitled to recognition under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the Constitution of the United States (Estin v. Estin, 334 U. S. 541, 68
Sup. Ct. 1213, 92 L. Ed. 1561 (1948)). The husband's divorce must be recognized as altering the marital status of the parties under the second Williams case . . . ,'but since the
New York law was interpreted to permit a maintenance order in a separation action
to survive a divorce, the prior maintenance order still prevails as far as the economic
relations of the parties are concerned.
The Estin case called attention to the injustice to a New York wife whose husband has obtained a divorce in another state in an ex parte proceeding. Unless she
had been able to get a separation order with maintenance prior to the foreign divorce,
she has no remedy. Under the Civil Practice Act maintenance of the wife may be
granted only as an incident to relief in a matrimonial action. Since 1883 it has been
accepted law, moreover, that there is no inherent power in the Supreme Court to grant
maintenance to a wife independent of statutory authority. Ramsden v. Ramsden, 91
2

N. Y. 281 (1883)."
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courts to grant discretionary maintenance to a wife in cases where it is not possible to
grant a divorce, separation, or annulment because the marriage has already been dissolved by the courts of another state, at the instance of the husband, in an action in
which personal jurisdiction over the wife was not obtained.
The parties to the instant action were Patricia and Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr. who
were married in Connecticut in 1948. At the time of the marriage the husband was
domiciled in Nevada. His wife was a domiciliary of California. Shortly after the
marriage the couple moved to California where they maintained their marital domicile
until their separation in September, 1952. Following the separation Mrs. Vanderbilt
came to New York, and in October, 1952, she sued for a separation. The suit was
dismissed, for failure to satisfy the one-year residence requirement of section 1165-a,
7
Subd. 3, of the New York Civil Practice Act.
Just prior to dismissal of her suit Mrs. Vanderbilt went to California, but she returned to New York in February, 1953, and remained here until commencement of
the present action. In March, 1953, Mr. Vanderbilt filed suit for divorce in Nevada.
Mrs. Vanderbilt was not personally served with process, nor did she appear in that
action. A final divorce decree was rendered by the Nevada court in June, 1953,
stating that both husband and wife were ". . . freed and released from the bonds
of matrimony and all the duties and obligations thereof. . . ." Under the law of
Nevada such a decree ends a husband's duty to support his wife. 8
In April, 1954, Mrs. Vanderbilt again instituted a separation action. On the ground
that the Nevada decree had effectively terminated the marriage, the court denied
the plea for a separation. However, it awarded alimony under section 1170-b, the judgment to be satisfied out of the husband's New York assets which had been sequestered
at the commencement of the suit. 9 The court found Mrs. Vanderbilt entitled to the
relief granted both by reason of having resided in New York continuously for more
than one year prior to commencement of her suit and by having been a resident of
the state at the time section 1170-b became effective.' 0 The decision of the trial court
was twice affirmed, 11 and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 12 upon
petition of the husband.
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the Court. It declared the Nevada
decree to be void for lack of jurisdiction insofar as it purported to affect the wife's
right to support in New York. New York, therefore, had not violated the full faith
and credit clause by awarding alimony.
In a nation where each state has the constitutional right to determine and enforce
its own policy respecting the institution of marriage, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court defining the extent to which divorces granted by one state must be
7 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 1165-a:
"Conditions attached to maintenance of action for annulment or separation.
An action to annul a marriage or for separation may be maintained in either of
the following cases:
3. Where the parties were married without the state and either the plaintiff or
the defendant is a resident of the state when the action is commenced, and has been a
resident thereof for at least one year continuously at any time prior to the commencement of the action."
8 See note 1, supra, at 417, 77 S. Ct. at 1361, 1 L. Ed. 2d at 1458.
9 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 207 Misc. 294, 138 N. Y. S. 2d 222 (Sup. Ct. N. Y.
Co. 1955).
10 Id. at 305, 138 N. Y. S. 2d at 236.
11 See note 9, supra, aff'd, 1 A. D. 2d 3, 147 N. Y. S. 2d 125 (1955), aff'd, 1 N. Y. 2d
342, 135 N. E. 2d 553 (1956).
12 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 352 U. S. 820, 77 S. Ct. 67, 1 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1957).
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recognized by the others necessarily assume great importance. 13 Each state has a
rightful and legitimate concern in the marital status of persons domiciled within its
borders. 1 4 On the other hand, the social effects of the marital relation are so farreaching that lack of certainty as to the existence of the status is highly undesirable,
It is this consideration which, in our highly mobile society, has made it imperative
that the divorces of one state be respected by the others.15
It was early recognized that the unique characteristics of the marital status were
such that a wronged party should be permitted to terminate the relation in the
state of the matrimonial domicile, in an in rem proceeding, without personal service
upon the non-resident spouse.' 6 Eventually it became necessary to decide what effect
such ex parle divorces should have outside the state where granted. It had early been
thought that the Act of Congress which defined the scope of the full faith and credit
dause' 7 required that all state judgments be given the same effect in other states
that they had by law in the state where rendered. This view was afterward qualified,
however, by making it clear that the Act did not apply to judgments rendered by a
court without the requisite jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter.' 8
Were ex parte divorce decrees entitled to be excepted from this rule? Development
of the answer to this question has taken many years and more than one ruling by the
United States Supreme Court.
In 1901 the Court ruled' 9 that a state must give full faith and credit to a
divorce granted to a deserted husband by the state of the matrimonial domicile on the
basis of constructive service of process. In that case New York was held barred from
subsequently granting the wife's petition for a divorce. Later, for the same reason, an
ex parte divorce granted the husband by the state of the matrimonial domicile was
held to preclude a subsequent award of alimony to the wife.2 0 No such full faith
and credit had to be given, however, to decrees of a state other than that of the
matrimonial domicile, for, in Haddock v. Haddock,2 1 New York was permitted to
grant a separation and alimony to a wife following an ex parle divorce granted the
husband in Connecticut, the state to which he had gone after leaving his wife. New
York had been the state of the matrimonial domicile, and there the wife had remained.
Haddock v. Haddock was overruled in what has come to be called the first
Williams case. 2 2 There it was held that the full faith and credit clause required that
recognition be given to an ex Parte divorce granted by any state in which one spouse
was domiciled. The second Williams case 2 3 made it clear, however, that the finding
Annot., 93 L. Ed. 962, at 962.
14 Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, 298, 63 S. Ct. 207, 213, 87 L. Ed. 279,
286 (1942).
15 Id. at 304-06, 63 S. Ct. at 216-17, 87 L. Ed. at 289-90 (concurring opinion).
16 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 24 L. Ed. 565 (1877) (dictum).
17 See note 5, supra.
18 See note 16, supra, at 729, 24 L. Ed. at 571; D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How.
165, 13 L. Ed. 648 (1850); Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457, 21 L. Ed. 897 (1873);
Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., Ky., 242 U. S. 394, 37 S. Ct. 152, 61 L. Ed. 386 (1917);
Nevin v. Martin, 22 F. Supp. 836, aff'd, 307 U. S. 615, 59 S. Ct. 1046, 83 L. Ed. 1497
(1938).
'9 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 S. Ct. 544, 45 L. Ed. 794 (1901).
20 Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U. S. 551, 33 S. Ct. 129, 57 L. Ed. 347 (1912).
21 201 U. S. 562, 26 S. Ct. 525, 50 L. Ed. 867 (1906).
22 See not6 14, supra.
13

23

(1945)

Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577
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of the original state on the question of domicile could later be readjudicated by a
second state.
Having established that ex parte divorces were entitled to full faith and credit
so long as rendered by the courts of a state in which one of the parties was domiciled, it remained for the United States Supreme Court to define the scope of full
faith and credit. State authorities were in conflict as to whether the requirement
necessarily terminated a wife's right to support in a second state even though the
decree would have had that. effect in the state where rendered.2 4

Mr. Justice Douglas expressed his view on this point in Esenwein v. Commonwealth.2 5 On the basis of Williams 11,26 the majority in the Esenwein case held that
a court was justified in refusing to revoke a support order upon its finding that the
petitioner had not had a bona fide domicile in Nevada when he obtained his divorce.
Mr. Justice Douglas concurred in the result but reached his decision on the basis that
full faith and credit did not necessarily require Pennsylvania to recognize the Nevada
decree insofar as it affected the wife's right to support. In a concurring opinion in
which he was joined by Mr. Justice Black, he said:
"I think it is important to keep in mind a basic difference between the problem
of marital capacity and the problem of support."
"We held in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287, that a Nevada divorce
decree granted to a spouse domiciled there was entitled to full faith and credit in
North Carolina. That case involved the question of marital capacity. The spouse
who obtained the Nevada divorce was being prosecuted in North Carolina for living
with the one woman whom Nevada recognized as his lawful wife."
"But I am not convinced that in absence of an appearance or personal service the
decree need be given full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance or support of
the other spouse or the children. . . .The problem under the full faith and credit
clause is to accommodate as fully as possible the conflicting interests of the two states.
. . .The question of marital capacity will often raise an irreconcilable conflict between the policies of the two states. . . .One must give way in the larger interest of
the Federal union. But the same conflict is not necessarily present when it comes to
maintenance or support. The state where the deserted wife is domiciled has a deep
concern in the welfare of the family deserted by the head of the household. If he is
required to support his former wife, he is27 not made a bigamist and the offsprings of
his second marriage are not bastardized."
Thus, was expressed the idea which in the instant case the United States Supreme
Court has given its most extended application to date, i.e. that a divorce decree may
effectively terminate the marital status without affecting related property rights. While
the designation has been criticized as a misnomer,28 the term, "divisible divorce,"
has come to be applied to the concept 29
In Estin v. Estin3 0 the United States Supreme Court applied the divisible concept to hold that a valid ex parte divorce had no effect upon the wife's rights under
a previous decree for separate maintenance granted by the state of the matrimonial
domicile. The instant case is important in that it establishes that the wife's right
Annot., 28 A. L. R. 2d 1378 at 1383 (1953), and cases there cited.
25 Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein 325 U. S.279, 65 S. Ct. 1118,
89 L. Ed. 1608 (1945).
24

See note 23, supra.
See note 25, supra, at 281, 65 S. Ct. at 1120, 89 L. Ed. at 1610.
28 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in this case, 354 U. S. at 424,
77 S. Ct. at 1360, 1 L. Ed. 2d at 1463; J. Fuld's dissenting opinion in this case,
1 N. Y. 2d 342, at 356, 135 N. E. 2d 553, at 559.
20 17 Am,. JuR. Divorce and Separation, § 947 (1957).
30 334 U. S. 541, 68 S. Ct. 1213, 92 L. Ed. 1561, 1 A. L. R. 2d 1412 (1948).
20
27
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to support or maintenance need not be supported by a prior judgment in order to
survive an ex parte divorce which effectively terminates the marital relation. The
Court now holds that the right exists separate and apart from any judgment, and
the wife cannot be deprived of it by any court acting without jurisdiction over her
person.

Actually the present ruling was foreshadowed by Mr. Justice Black's concurring
opinion in the Armstrong case. 31 There the majority upheld Ohio's award of alimony
to a wife after her husband had obtained a divorce in Florida in an ex Parte proceeding, but it did so on the theory that Florida had left open the question of alimony. Mr. Justice Black, on the other hand, considered that Florida had adjudicated
the question of alimony. He based his concurrence on the Estin case:
"The fact that Mrs. Estin's claim to support had been reduced to judgment prior to
divorce while Mrs. Armstrong's had not is not a meaningful distinction. Mrs. Armstrong's right to support before judgment, like Mrs. Estin's right to support after
judgment, is the kind of personal right which cannot be adjudicated without personal service."32

The reasoning of the concurring opinion in the Armstrong case has become the
reasoning of the Court in the instant case.
Whether or not one approves of the term, "divisible divorce," does not seem
particularly important. To hold, as the Court did here, that a wife's right to be
supported by her husband is entitled to survive unless or until she is deprived of
it in an action in which she appears or is personally served with process, does not seem
an unwarranted extension of the rule that personal rights cannot be adjudicated without personal jurisdiction over the parties affected.33 As further stated by Mr. Justice
Black in the Armstrong case,34 older authorities indicate the possibility of property
rights surviving termination of the marital status itself. The present decision does not
say that an individual's interest in his or her marital status itself is less a personal
right than the economic rights and obligations attached to that status. It merely indicates that the former is a right in which absolute certainty is so desirable as to warrant an exception to the general rule, while the latter rights are not so favored.35
By grounding its decision, as it did, on the invalidity of the Nevada decree insofar
as it purported to affect property rights, the Court makes it unnecessary any longer
to weigh the conflicting interests of two states when the question is whether a wife's
support rights have been affected by an ex parte divorce. Had the Court instead
ruled that the Nevada decree was entitled to full faith and credit in its entirety, but
that New York might be relieved from granting such recognition by an overriding
policy of her own,36 it seems possible that Nevada's interest in the welfare of the
husband who had lived in that state for some years prior to his marriage might well
have been given greater weight than any interest New York could have had in such
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U. S. 568, 76 S. Ct. 629, 100 L. Ed. 705 (1956).
Id. at 577, 76 S. Ct. at 634, 100 L. Ed. at 713.
33 See note 16, supra.
34 See note 31, supra, at 578, 76 S. Ct. at 634, 100 L. Ed. at 714, and authorities there cited, especially, Pennoyer v. Neff, note 16 supra at 734:
"... we do not mean to assert, by any thing we have said, that a State may
not authorize proceedings to determine the status of one of its citizens towards a nonresident which would be binding within the State, though made without service of
process or personal notice to the non-resident . . ."
35 See the related remarks of Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in
this case, 354 U. S. at 433, 77 S.Ct. at 1370, 1 L. Ed. 2d at 1467.
36 Mr. Justice Harlan favored such a ruling. See his dissenting opinion, 354
U. S. at 430, 77 S.Ct. at 1369, 1 L. Ed. 2d at 1466.
31
32
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a short-term resident as the wife in this case. Certainly now we are freed from any
such speculation.
Seen as a refusal to extend an exception to the rule that a state cannot adjudicate the personal rights of a non-resident except upon personal service, and as a refusal to extend the full faith and credit clause to cover extended exceptions to the
former rule, when an overriding Federal interest does not demand it, the present
decision seems conservative. While it would perhaps be desirable to view a divorce
decree as a unit, valid for all purposes or void for all purposes, there is much to
be said for a divisible concept. Such a concept achieves a maximum of balance between conflicting state interests while at the same time respecting the overriding federal interest in certainty of the marital status, particularly when the concept can be so
well supported on fundamental legal principles.
The decision leaves it squarely up to the Courts of New York to interpret wisely
the phrase, "as justice may require," contained in section 1170-b, in order that New
York shall not become a litigation ground for matrimonial issues properly triable
elsewhere.

